MS 562 - United States. Army. Ohio Infantry Regiment, 21st: Transcripts (June 1890)

June 6, 1890

[Letterhead]
21st Ohio Reply to yours of the 5/30
St. Louis, June 6, 1890.

Col. A. McMahan, Toledo, Ohio.

Dear Sir:--

I am happy to hear from you again and assure you I am grateful for your sending me the photograph of Gen. Boynton's Map,(?) and the copy of the letter of his of July 26th 1889. I return the two herewith.

Now, for some private, like one belonging to the 22nd Michigan who, with one of his Captains, ran away early in the day and reported back at Chattanooga that his Regiment was captured to have made such a map and location of troops, might be excusable. But for a General of the army, a man who commanded a regiment on that ridge, a man who had been on the ground several times since the war, and but a few short months at the farthest before he made the map, a man, too, who has written so extensively by the battle, to produce such a blunder, is beyond my comprehension.

Starting at the left of the map Col. Harker's line did not run in the direction shown, but bore to the northeast, instead of the southeast from the general line of the Ridge, as shown on my map of the ridge. When there last month I carefully went over that part of the ridge with various ones who were there engaged, and others who came there to consult with Gens. Thomas and Granger. As soon as I glanced over the line I told had that it had evidently been wrongly reported that for Harker's Regiments to have fired in the manner that was claimed, they must have conformed to the general curvations. Just as quick as I mentioned it one of Harker's lieutenants spoke up and said, "Why certainly, our lines ran around here," and pointed to where they ran. He and Major Williams, of Gen. Baldwin's staff, showed also where Generals Thomas, Granger and others had put in part of the afternoon, in a sort of pocket in the side of the ridge, also where the 18th Ohio Battery lay in reserve by them. I suppose, to Gen. Fullerton, who first pointed out the line to me, it had appeared straight or nearly so, as I show if on my map. It would be utterly impossible for it to bear in the direction that Gen. Boynton shows it, as the land in no manner there agrees with the official reports. Next, starting from Snodgrass house, the Ridge runs almost due south, for some 700 or 800 ft. Our lines ran around that southern projection, as indicated by the dotted lines on my map. That of course is immaterial, for I suppose the General only intended to show where your Regiment was. But if the General thought enough of it to have it photographed, he of course intended it to be historical;-- and thus he proceeds by his map and his letter to locate Mitchell during the whole of the afternoon from 2 to 6.30 p.m., immediately on your right, and puts the 89th Ohio, with 22nd Michigan in support, to the right to infinity, {that is where I think Gen. Whitaker went. I saw him going to the rear, after he tried to get the men of my battery to fix bayonets on their cannon.} Gen. Boynton can have no possible excuse for having made this great blunder. Notwithstanding he was with the party who drove the stake to show Mitchell in that position, and which I discovered last September, and which has resulted in all this work, for he had access to Official Reports, he had associated and conversed with officers who commanded all along that line, and he should have known 20 years before, just how that line was formed. At this late date, it is beyond my comprehension how it is possible that so many officers who were engaged on that ridge, know so little about was down where especially so of the staff officers, who were supposed to have ridden several times along the line. To think of a Brigade commander having absolute nothing about the part played by his Brigade in so important a battle, seems to me incredible. I think the great fault of Gen. Boynton is, that he does not investigate before writing. His readers, of course, do not investigate and therefore, because he writes profusely, they think whatever he says is absolutely the truth, not even noticing where his different articles contradict themselves.

Now, taking up his letter to you. In the first place he says where was certainly great blame for not notifying the 21st Ohio and 22nd Michigan of the withdrawal of the other troops. Now if Mitchell had been between you two at the time, as per his map, one part or the other should have discovered his withdrawal and should have felt anxiety enough regarding his position to have sent for information as to why such a gap was made in the line, for certainly no man that day, with so great force of the enemy confronting him, would have thought of fighting for any time with his flanks unsupported, when he was over-lapped by the enemy, without reporting it. One who would not have so reported should have been court-marshaled as he would be endangering the army too much. So if there was any blame, the blame should have rested on the commanders of those regiments according, to that map. But he next says that it was Granger's fault, as both he and Steedman admitted after the battle. They blamed themselves for not have notified Van Derveer of their withdrawal. Now, I do not believe a word of this, and I will tell you this much in advance, I think no one can prove that either of the Generals was on his part of the line at that hour of the day. I have pretty good evidence that Gen. Granger did not visit his line at all,--that a goodly portion of the afternoon he was in charge of Thomas' headquarters and was so in command, while Thomas was over on the Lafayette road where he gave that immortal order to Gen. Turchin to clear the woods of rebels, which let the general make his wonderful "scharge"; and at dusk, when the troops were being withdrawn, to your right, Gen. Steedman was back near the Mullis house, tring to rally and reorganize the troops that where coming pell-mell across the field from Thomas' line where they had been thrown into confusion, by the rebels charging on them when they attempted to withdraw. Now, this is confidential. But I assure you I am unearthing a good deal regarding very many officers, that there is no trace of at first glance in the Official Reports I have detected some errors in the advance sheets. These will be corrected when the books are finally published. This is also confidential. But they have considerable bearing on very many things that were done on the field. By merest accident I ran across a very important witness regarding General Rosecrans on the 20th He is a county judge in Kansas, and passed through here to visit the field with us. He called on me to have me get him his ticket as the Rail Road could not sell threm publicly on the 19th. He was not on the battlefield during the engagement, and my simply remarking to him that he was in Chattanooga, as I knew he was, caused him to make the remark "Yes, and hardly so for I was stationed with my command at a certain point,"--which he proceed to tell and then casually remarked what he had noticed while there, not thinking that his words were of any historical importance whatever, but I assure you they are of immense value. At the proper time, when I get some missing links replaced (through there are very few missing now), I will present to you the whole chain of evidence.

I am at present investigating one of the Official Reports as it appears in the advance sheet. Before I get it settled I may have to examine the original paper, to see whether it has been tampered with since it was written. If not, then there were others on the field, or off it, who far more merited being shot as a coward than Gen. Negley. Nearly every letter I get contains a little expression that is a key to very much, which the writer places no importance upon whatever, for instance, one of the staff Officers this morning, in a letter to me, makes two or three statements what fill up exactly little gaps that I have hunted for considerable time to find some one to fill. When I first started out in this work, I made the assertion that everything that transpired that day, occurred at a certain time, and with a certain bearing on something else, which of course was the case. That these things could be discovered and dove tailed together just as they occurred if proper steps were taken to accomplish it. Of course, to do it may require years of hard work and all portions of the civilized world may have to be searched through, yet, it can be done, and the true history of the battle can not be written until it is done.

Now, one man, in a letter, says that at a certain hour the right flank of the 22nd Mich. was in some hazel brush, beyond which they could not see. This was on a charge it was making, and from what he says, though he does not intend to so imply, many of the men must have been captured on that charge. The work now, is to find such a patch of hazel brush. I have not seen any such yet, along the ridge. This will account for so few men, if it shall be so proven, remaining to be captured at night, and will also account for the report having been made that the Regiment was captured early in the afternoon. This report, I find, is very generally believed by their men.

To proceed.--The "narrow thicket" which Gen. Baynton mentions, he pointed out to me, and I assure you it is a narrow thicket. It is the thicket through which he peered when he saw the rebels coming up the ravine, to his left front, exactly, I think, to a degree at due south-west of where he was then standing. These rebels, however, did not reach his line, and he had no engagement with them. The only shots he fired were fired at the rebel orderly who rode up and inquired what regiment that was, the shots which where fired into your men at dusk. Gen. Fullerton was also present as well as Col. Robinson and Mr. Gill, and heard this statement. When he saw them is regiment was lying along the brow of the ridge, facing south-west. He immediately ordered them to stretch out to the west from across the ridge just above the depression and 132 feet west of the old graves he then reported what he had seen to General Brannan. Gen. Brannan told him to go back there, and he would send some fragments of Regiments that were there coming in from the left, to his assistance. He told Gen. Brannan they might question his authority to place them in line. Brannan replied "I will tell him to report to the officer in command there, not giving your name, and they will not question, seeing you in command. He did not see any rebel to his right front or north-west, nor did any appear there, no matter what he may say now, or waht the others may say, and I am telling you just what he said. Remember I have been hunting for the truth, and not to build up, or tear down anybody. I have no favorites whatever in this matter, so that I can have no possible object in misrepresenting any-thing, and what may I tell you is simply to let you know how I am getting along in certain directions, though my work is extending over the whole battlefield and over everyday from the 16th till long after the battle.

Gen. Boynton says, what he discovered the rebels in the ravine in his rear, coming by the flank from toward Mitchell's line. Now, this is strange, if the truth, according as he stated on the field as his Regiment lay at that time and the way the ravine runs, toward the southwest, he might say they were coming up on his flank, but it would not be proper to say his rear, nor has he any reason for saying that they were Trigg's and Kelly's forces, for if he would investigate he would know that the rebels which he saw, could not have belonged to either of those Brigades, but his using their names, shows that he had certainly seen enough of the reports to know that those two Brigades participated in the capture. The troops which he saw, and there were but few of them, by the way, only a few stragglers apparently, or possibly a skimmish line, could not have known about your capture at that time. He extended his line, as he stated to me, to prevent the rebels getting around him, as they should come up the ravine. You can see that I am right, for he said that his men who discovered them, had been down the edge of the ridge in front of his regiment. Now, if the rebels were coming over the north side of the ridge and his Regiment was on the south side of it, you can see that a man going down in front of his Regiment could not have looked over the ridge to see the rebels coming up the ravine on the other side, unless the man had a very curved sight. You know very well, whether there was any firing along his line, after those shots were fired into you, and that will confirm or disprove what I have said and whether he tells the truth where says in this letter that after the portions of other Regiments had been brought up there that they then broke their lines and drove them off, at about 7:45 P.M. He then goes on to say how Grangers troops were formed. If he had posted himself a particle, he would have known which of Granger's Brigades was sent in first to join on Brannan and which went in on its right, making the extreme right of the Union line that afternoon.

Yes those Colt's Revolving Rifles made quite an impression on him. He told me about them too.

I dislike to comment on what he says about Mitchell's and Whitakers' withdrawal. I think however, that by the time I get through with it, I will have pretty good proof that there were not very many left of either of those Brigades along the Ridge to withdraw at 6:30, for there is not much room, as you can see on my map, from where you surrendered, to the extreme right of our lines, only a few hundred feet. A goodly portion of this was covered by the 115th Ill. and that left very little for other Regiments to cover. Some Regiments are as yet, unaccounted for, at that hour of the day. This is especially the case with the 96th Ill. except Co. A, of that Regiment. A portion of that Company, I think, without doubt was with the 121st Ohio, in fact, a little in front of it, a few minutes before the break of the 115th that is, it was out over near B on my map, as it was seen there by a staff officer who belonged to that Regiment. It may not have been further out than C. The 121st was there extending from D toward C, and facing to the west, I can find no one belonging to that company who knows anything about the balance of the Regiment.

Let me add, including this part, that I have as yet, found no trace of either of Steedman's Brigade commanders having been seen on the field after 4:30 in the afternoon. At that line I saw Gen. Whitaker riding toward the rear.

Now as to your comments on his letter. I do not know as Gen. Boynton even yet mistrusts that when his Regiment fired toward that orderly that his shot found any one beyond. Now, I did not understand him to mean that each one who fired aimed at the orderly, but that it was a general discharge by his Regiment, in that direction, and that the orderly and horse were killed. At the time, they supposed it was a rebel officer.

In this work, I have found scarcely one who attempted to fix the hour when anything occurred, who asserted that he consulted his watch at the time, or knew, if he had a watch, whether it was right or not. Many have said they had no watches. This is especially true of the Confederates, and one Confederate officer, who commanded on their left told me that he was not in the habit of consulting his watch, but merely guessed at the time. There in the woods, and among the hills and in the dense smoke, to guess at the hour of sunset, would depend very much upon where the person was. Of course it is evident from Gen. Brannan's Official Reports that he got most of his information from others. Yes, there is no doubt from the evidence produced, that at the very time Brannan's line was withdrawn the Confederates were preparing to go into bivouac, or were completely their capture, that is, preparing to send the prisoners to the rear.

Now as to yous headed "Looking Backward." At this time I was there with Gen'ls. Boynton, Fulleton, et al., I knew nothing whatever of this dispute or misunderstanding. I simply [blank space] what Gen. Boynton stated. I was making measurements and marking trees, from which to make future measurements. I had given the subject no thought, before that, not having dreamed that it could be possible for any such serious blunders to have been made, as I saw when the stakes were pointed out to me in September. If you will send anyone with the General and me to the field, not before that saying anything to him why, I venture, to say that he will again point out to me the same ravine that he saw the rebels coming up, and the same place were his men had been. If, however, he should be notified of the trap into which he got himself, he might perhaps undertake to say that it was the ravine on the north side of the ridge that he meant, but then, his movement of his Regiment would conflict with that statement, for in that case he should have taken his Regiment around to the north-west slope of the ridge, instead of simply forming it, or extending it, sightly across the ridge, for he showed me how for over he had moved his line, not any down the north slope, or around toward the north-west, and if the enemy were coming up in that direction it would have still left his flank and rear exposed. If the woods were "full of rebels" he did not see them nor know of their being in but the one direction, and there only a small body, and he felt so safe, with his lengthened out and necessarily weakened line, by so doing, that he in person went back to hunt up General Brannan to explain to him the situation, instead of remaining there to manage affairs, and sending some one else to report. As to the War Department Maps, you can in no manner depend on the scale, or the location of the ridges any more than you can on the location of the troops. The troops were located on the map hap-hazard, after I had proven to them the error they made in reversing the Brigades. That is how it happens that my Battery is shown, as well as some of the Infantry, on the north ridge. There are cannon shots in trees on that ridge, and I have at last been able to determine when, and by whom they were put there. It was done before Granger's men arrived. On so small of a scale, it would be next to impossible, were the topographical part of the map correct, to show the positions and lengths of lines, without confusion. Of course I do not mean to say impossible, because I have done mapping that I would guarantee could by a scale of equal parts, be measured to the small fraction of a foot, and would agree exactly with the land, But such accuracy is not often attempted in map making, while the War Department Maps are only intended to show approximately where Brigades and Divisions were, without any particular regard as to extent of ground they covered. In locating the Regiments on my map, I simply judged from the numbers of men supposed to be in a Regiment at the time, the amount of ground they would cover, after having definitely located where some of the Regiments were at that time, and where the others were in relation to them. By a misunderstanding or a misrepresentation, I reversed the 98th and 113th Ohio. The 98th actually went in to the left of the 113th in its first charge.

The legend, is made up from "Legends." In the first place, you can very easily understand that the person who has taken a very decided position that he is right, and that the one questioning him, is wrong, would naturally, when compelled to acknowledge his error, endeavor to make it as light as possible.

Kelly did not charge on Brannan's front and was no where near it and if you will take any of Kelly's men who are at all familiar with the ground, and go there with them they will show you that hey were very far to his right, as compared with the whole length of Snodgrass Ridge.

Now, to your letter on May 30th. You say you addressed two letters to me at Chattanooga. I received but one. I will be very grateful to you for a copy of the other. I think the same party has it who carried the one I did receive, a day or so in his pocket before sending it to me. As I before said, I think it probable that Co. A of the 96th Ill. Was for a time on the extreme right, and that at the close of the day, but no other part of the Regiment, at least I have found no one, even to the Staff officer who belonged to it, who knows anything about its having been there, and he was much surprized when he found Co. A there.

I find in the official reports and also in covering and corresponding with officers, that it is their habit to call even a single gun a Battery.

The 115th Ill. did not see or know, of any guns being on its right, or on that part of the field, until just at dusk, when my two guns were sent to it. The time when Co. A of the 96th with the 121st Ohio formed on the left (as they call it), of the Battery, was when the left section Lt. Flusky commanding, was sent out to near B, on my map. But it is not yet proven that they went there. The men belonging to those guns ought certainly to know something about where they were and what they did.

With all deference to Col. Champion, his account of the battle sounds very much like some of the language of an inflated Kentuckian.

I should like very much to correspond with Srgt. C.D. Pierce, of whom you speak. He may possibly be able to give me some information regarding several things concerning his Regiment. I could tell in two minutes, if I were on the ground with him, how good a memory he has.

I expected to be in possession of positive proof in a few days, regarding Capt. Russell's body. The chain of evidence is quite complete now. As to the Century article to which you allude, I think I told you that a certain staff officer had made certain acknowledgements concerning the 22nd Michigan. I have a very lengthy account written by one of the participants. showing how it was finally agreed that the troops should be located, or rather, the stakes driven which have caused this mischief, and out of 7 present who should have been on the ridge, during the afternoon of the battle, but two of them knew anything positive as to the location of the troops. One of those only guessed it from an incident which occurred before the first charge, and the other was not present at the time the location was agreed upon, so it was determined by five who really knew nothing about it. Yes, it is too bad that so many have quilty of writing what the mass must accept as history, who did so without knowing the truth or who wilfully perverted it. One of course, forms his impression from what he first sees and hears, and it is very hard to disabuse the mind of such an impression, if erroneous. A letter from Col. Carlton yesterday, says that he got the impression of our line extending very far to his right, and he finds it very hard for him to change the impression of years so as to bring it within the limited of my measurements, that is, that our right did not extend further west than D. on my map.

As I understood from Major Cusac, he, with a portion of the Regiment, remained in the depression where you had been, before you with your part, moved to the right of the 89th, and he showed me where some of his men escaped. But here comes in the puzzle. If the 35th Ohio was where Gen. Boynton say it was, (and he fixes it positively from the old graves,) how could your men, if they were you were before you went to the right, and where Major Cusac says they were, have escaped as he says they did, without their having run into the 35th Ohio which was but a few feet from them, and if they ran into the 35th Ohio why did they not say to them why they had done so, and thus the capture be made known there. There are many very mysterious points along that ridge, yet unsettled.

I have quite a few letter from Col. Bailey, and an occasional word here and there in them, has helped me to trace up very many nice points. From your description of the lay of the land, and the trees, I can not see how it is possible that there is any mistake as to where you were, and also as to where the 35th Ohio was. If there is any mistake, then it extends along the whole of what part of the line, and we have yet to find where Whitaker's Brigade first went in. The 89th Ohio, must have gone on top of the ridge while you where there in front, and its left flank must have shoved to the right after it reached the crest, and formed on your right, else you could not have been there. If it did that, then where was the 22nd Michigan at that time, and where did that ascend the ridge, for it went up a considerable time ahead of the 89th. The 22nd was not represented at our meeting, which I very much regret.

Gen. Boynton still wears large glasses, and makes one think they are goggles, through he may have worn real goggles at the time. They are certainly a very good identifying mark of the individual.

I did not understand from Gen. Boynton, that his Regiment had done any fighting on the ridge, and do not yet know that it did.

Was it the 2nd Minn. that relieved you, in position no.3, and the 35th Ohio, for I have not as yet learned any error in my locating the 35th Ohio and the 2nd Minn. on that map I sent you, as I did. There is a stake driven in the ground, in a depression in the ridge which states that that was the centre of the 2nd Minn. at exactly the point I have marked it on my map. This is in the depression to the east of the knob on which the old graves are. I have yet had no time to give much attention to the line, along the ridge east of the 35th Ohio, but an gradually accumulating material and evidence to work from, when I get to that part of the field. If there is any error as to the 2nd Minn. it is not mine, any more than was I responsible for the stake claiming to represent where Mitchell was; or the other one which claims to show Whitaker's right. If it can be possible that you were over in that depression and that the 35th Ohio was east of that, then there will be abundant room to the west for Steedman's troops without any crowding. But how are you going to account for the position of the 89th Ohio, and your being with them at the time of the capture, being over where their men located them, and and with nothing to guide them to the spot except the lay of the land, and all this agreeing exactly with where I had previously located them, from the evidence which had been furnished me. It cannot be possible that the trees, etc. which you describe are over there. I saw none such when I passed there last month. I pointed out to those with me the ground which is marked as having been occupied by the 2nd Minn. But then to locate you over there, would cause an immense muddle in the Confederate Reports, as to where Gracie, Kershaw and others were engaged.

I can imagine what Col. Bailey's remarks would be if he could see this letter and map of Gen. Boynton's. But I do not desire, in this work, to be the means of any unpleasant feeling between anyone. Which I mention sometimes in letters what has been writen me, or told me, for the purpose of drawing out those to whom I am writing, I have been very careful to say if in such manner that they can have no idea of where I got my information. With you it is quite different. I have written you very freely, but in very many cases, in writing you, I have avoided giving names so as to make it impossible for any unpleasantness to arise from what I have written. I have not given up the hope of yet proving how it was there about the moiety of those that belonged to the three Regiments which where taken prisoners were captured at night. If I live I think I will succeed in clearing it up. You speak of skulkers. I was told of one ravine in the rear of the ridge that was quite solidly in the packed with them. Many officers were there. When they left there I have not yet learned. One of the men belonging to my Battery had helped to take a wounded comrade to the rear. From what he heard some of the officers saying there, he concluded that it would be better for him not to go back to the front, and he remained with them. This man had two brothers occupying high positions in the Confederate army. One of them is still alive and is very promiment in the south. I frequently run across an Official Report in the records, made by one of them, so you can see that this man was undoubtedly intelligent enough to understand what he saw and heard. As he was a long while in the Regular army before the war, and not as a private, he understood army matters pretty well. He was intimately acquainted with many of the old regular officers. I hope you will not permit this long drawn out effusion to tax your strength. When you become tired of reading tear it up.

Again thanking you kindness in sending me the map, etc. and for the great assistance you have rendered me in this work.

Very Resp'y
G.E. Dolton.

June 14, 1890

June 14/90-

Colonel Arnold McMahan
Toledo, Ohio

Dear Sir:--

Yours of May 20th, and the "Close Corporation" received.

I assure you, that seeing how erroneous the War Maps were on their face, and knowing how they were made up and who were to blame for the same, I have paid no further attention to them. Any one who had even glanced at the official reports would know that Kelly did not go in between Brannan and LaFavour, but formed across the ridge to the right of La Favour, while Trigg passed to his rear.

I supposed I had hinted plainly enough for you to understand what the purpose of that "Close Corporation" was. It was to get the Park and the locating of troops, marking maps, & c, into its own hands, so as to certainly and permanently silence every one who should presume to question anything that has been or may be done. That was my only reason for visiting the field in May, for I knew I would not be permitted to do so, after they should have any authority to stop me. I know now, that I will not be allowed to make further surveys, and they will use the press freely to cast reproach on all I have done or may do. Col. Bailey has no more power and will be no more heeded, than my youngest child, in anything he may now attempt. He cannot geta word into the Gazette without Boynton's first seeing and consenting to it, and for him to say one word outside, would cost him his position on that paper, and would bring upon him the silent, underhanded, cut-throat work of that "Corporation." There is large money also, in reach of that "Corporation", as innocent as some of the dear little lambs were in some of their speeches.

I shall go on with any work of endeavoring to fix each movement and incident, as it occurred, on all parts of the field. A letter, this A. M. from one staff officer, gives the nailing proof of three very important items which fix very many parts of the field, as to time-- though he was not aware that he was giving such valuable evidence. It is being furnished me from all directions, and in no case, have I said a word to indicate what I wanted to know. It is proving right along what I have claimed from the first--that all events occurred in certain order and in certain time, and that it is not yet too late to determine each and to dove-tail them together exactly as they occurred in the battle. When so arranged, the truth of the battle will be known, and cannot possibly be until then.

No, Sir, unless some one does just such work as I am doing, (and I can learn of no one who even attempted it.) and shall carry it through, the truth of Chickamauga will never be known. I shall be crippled in my work, from this on, as that "Corporation" will stop everyone from giving me any information, as fast as it can do so. It was for that very purpose it published these two notices from Washington regarding the May meeting.

Of course, where a person has not the ability or energy to push his investigations to completeness, he must accept theory for truth. If he has not good judicial brains, he will not be able to distinguish between fiction, falsehood and guesswork that will be furnished him in ninety-nine instances out of a hundred,--cannot tell such from the truth. How eagerly I have seen such men as Boynton, et al- snap at stuff that was offered them, and at once proceed to write very learnedly--as notice the General's account of the error on the Ridge which he published after our return from there last November. Nearly every letter I got has a little truth in it; but the bulk of the most of them is dross.

The "Corporation" will continue to ignore every one who pretends to know anything that does not conform to what it intends shall be established as history--and it intends to build up certain ones and to let all others pass as near as possible, into oblivion.

Personally, I ought not to complain, or to say one word; for it accords my battery even more than I claim for it, and the War Dept. has certainly treated me with far greater respect than I could have looked for. It has accepted my evidence while positively refusing that of even Generals in Command, so I am assured. It has changed the War Records in several instances to conform to my statements, while it reversed on the War Maps, the two brigades as it had agreed upon before: but I want no false history. I want only such as will bear the closest investigation, even, if in insisting upon it, I may incur the enmity of the Dept. and the "Corporation."

Yes, undoubtedly, but for that "Corporation" it would be quite easy work. Very many would come forward willingly to assist, who are now afraid to.

Our staff Officer--in fact two or three of them--have indicated that while they would gladly assist, they must bear in mind "the powers that be." Yet, I am managing to worm out of of [sic] them very much of great value; but I have to do it so they do not suspect--they are like little children--speak out without dreaming of the result.

There seems to be no one at the Department who has a mind of his own, nor one who dares do anything that may displease the "Corporation." That has to be first consulted. I should have furnished the Dept. very much more than I have, had I not known that it would all be submitted to the "Corporation" and that said "Corporation" would use it as its own work and investigation, and I do not propose using my time and money for any such purpose.

I told you that the real battle would begin as soon as the "Corporation" should come into power, and that then the tug of war would be. The time may yet come, to make the open fight; but that time is not yet ripe. Before I say or do anything in that direction, I want to be better entrenched all over the field; but I assure you, that when I know I am right, I never surrender one jot or tittle, and when I begin the fight, it will be with the intention of fighting to the end, regardless of what forces may be arrayed against me. Of course, I am fully aware that the public worships "title" and that the cry will be raised "sore-head'--and for that reason, I want my forces to be so arranged that I can disprove every such change, and compel attention and credence. So that the public may know the truth, and that history shall be the truth, I care not who makes this known to the public. I am not working for any fame--want none--and our willing that any one who will, shall take the proofs and sustain them to the world--my name not to appear. To me it is the work to be done, and not the person who does it, that should be considered.

Certainly, Gen. Boynton having read enough of the Official Reports to know that Kelly was somewhere in that region, and he having seen that hand-full of men on his left front, would naturally suppose they were Kelly's men, and then he and Capt. Kellogg put their heads together as to how to get them in there--and, behold--Map no. 8! If a rebel reached the crest of the Ridge in that "slight depression", that evening, it was long after the surrender, and after Boynton had gone: but there were enough of them for all practical purposes, in the deep depression to the right of La Favour, about dusk.

Now that the "Close Corporation" is practically in posession, what do you suggest?

Very respectfully--
G.E. Dolton

[In left margin, last page] To give you an idea of what attention that "Corporation" is likely to give to those not of their liking, the leader of it used this language--"Some years ago, some fellow in Toledo, pretended to know all about it & c." "I think his name was Mc something."

June 16, 1890

St. Louis, June 16/90
Col. Arnold McMahan
Toledo, Ohio.

Dr Sir:--

Your esteemed favor of 14th at hand. I am not surprised at your being disgusted at the turns the investigation has taken; but, I assure you I find it the same all over the field--even when attempting to work from the Official Reports written at the time, and that is why I used the language that I did, that one to do such work must have a good judicial mind to distinguish the true from the false. We must not lose sight of a single point, so he can dectect at once when a statement conflicts with a possibility.

For one to go to the field in company with others, to locate positions, he must not permit his memory to be perverted by statements made by others who evidently know very little, if anything. Major Cusac, I could see at once, attended strictly to his own business that day, and knew absolutely nothing about any other troops either on his right or on his left. But at the meeting, he seemed to accept the various statements of those who did a heap of guessing about their own commands, and nothing but guessing about others.

Now, I think you misunderstood my last letter, and I will endeavor to make it plain.

On the map enclosed, I have endeavored to mark, as I understand it, the location of the four regiments after you moved to the right, intothe ravine or depression in the Ridge, when the 35 Ohio relieved you. After you had taken that position, the 22dMich. was on your right, and the 89th Ohio on the right of the 22d Mich. and extending well to the apparent end of the ridge--or nearly to the deep depression, the line being formed around the south side of the crest of the ridge. I have marked those positions thus [drawing]. Next, I show by this [drawing] mark, the positions held by the three regiments at the time of the surrender, and show the position in the same way, taken by the 35 Ohio, after Gen. Boynton saw the few rebels in his left front, as indicated in red ink. Then I show the positions of Kelly and Trigg thus [drawing] at the time of the surrender. B.R. Johnson had made a change and Steedman left at the XXX marked, when Kelly formed across the Ridge and advanced from the west, and Trigg went around to your right rear.

From Gen. Boynton's letter to you, one must understand that Trigg came up the ravine in the rear of the depression where you had been before you went to the Right fo the 89th Ohio, and that he saw his men there. Now, I said that he did not see Trigg's men at all, as they did not get near enough up to him to be seen. They must have come within fifty feet of him, or he could not have seen them. A proof that he did not see them, nor drive them away, is the fact that Trigg quietly bivouaced right where he was, for the night.

Now, as you understand it--am I right or wrong? If wrong, wherein?

One lieutenant of the 89th stated on the field, that when they first went up the hill, the left of his company passed the old graves-- as some of his men said they did: but, I am well convinced from my cross-questioning, that he never heard of the graves until I called his attention to them that day. In fact, I went and showed them to him, and after that he remembered his men speaking of them. If you were along that depression and the 89th went up where he claimed, then it swept over you, and afterwards moved to the right. But, what of the 22nd. Mich? Col. Carlton asserts that when he went up the Ridge, the 22d. had been up for some time, and that he had been fighting for considerable while before he discovered the 22d. on his left. If the 22d in its first charge had gone up further to the east than you were, then it, too, must have passed you, as it moved to the west: but Col. Carlton knows of no movement of that regiment to the west --and at dusk, when he went over to consult with Col. La Favour, the 22d. joined him on the left--or eastern, was formed I show thus [drawing].

I claim that Trigg was along the north side of the Ridge, but did not extend far enough to the east, at the time of the surrender, for Brynton to see him, and yet he could have been in the ravine in the ridge, running down north from the depression where you had been.

As I understood Major Cusac that day--he listened to those 89th, and from what they stated, tried to locate the 22d. Mich. If he had discarded every statement they made, and had adhered to his own memory, he would have been led into no error--as I suggested as modestly as I could, several times. Col. McSpadden and several others, undertook to tell their recollections (?) From what others told them. At one time, Col. McSpadden stated where my battery was, "From what do you locate it there?" I asked. "Why, Lieut. Royce says it was there." (Lieut. Royce was of 115th, Ill, and was not near there.) I asked him to please not be governed by any one; but to state his recollections only. I then asked him to show me how his brigade was formed at that time. He showed. "Now," said I--"from what direction did the canister come then?" "Why, from directly in front--Oh--your battery stood right in there where that carriage stands." That was the exact spot I marked D. on my Map last fall. Now, with all due respect to Major Cusac and the others--the burden of the proof which I have, shows that the 22nd. Mich was on your right all the time from when you moved to the right of the 89th. Ohio with a portion of your regiment. And, if this is not correct, then the 21st. was not in that depression, but in the one over to the East where I find the stake driven as the position of the 2d. Minn. and very little is yet established.

You speak of the room for troops that I mentioned--Well, look on my map, and suppose that we did actually get out as far as B. Then from F.--the right of the 89th, to Bis only about 1200 feet, and in that space we had to accomodate the 96th, Ill, 115th. Ill, 40 Ohio, 84 Ind, 98th 113th, and 121st Ohio and 78 Ill. and Bat. M. 1st Ill. But as a matter of fact, there were no troops south of D except during some charges, and they always fell back on the line of D to F. or nearly so, a distance, in straight line, of only 600 feet--200 yards.

Very respectfully-
G.E. Dolton

When these clashings appear, I see there is more work to be done, to clear them up--I do not despond. I far rather they would appear now, than to have them turn up after I think I am ready for a public summing up. In fact, I want them to appear, if they exist. Each on helps me to unravel something else. Every one persits to some other movement, and I hail each with pleasure. When I can feel assured they are all in, then I shall be ready to beginto dove-tail the parts together as they belong.

P.S. Can you tell me where I can find any one who belonged to the 22d. Mich, and who was captured with it?

From McMahan January 30, 1890